What the Iran Nuclear Weapons Agreement Borrows From JFK

Read Time:4 Minute, 3 Second

…as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries.

– President John F. Kennedy, July 26, 1963
Speaking to the nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

For the audio version of this article CLICK HERE.

The Soviet Union and the United States had, for years, been working at a ban on nuclear tests. The instant death that comes with nuclear weaponry was well known after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not everyone in those cities had died. The effects of nuclear radiation at maximum concentration just short of lethal levels were horrific.

The slower introduction of massive radiation through nuclear tests had prompted the two opposing nuclear superpowers to look for limitations.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in the previous October had brought home the possibility that the nuclear horror that had been visited on Japanese cities might become worldwide. The brush with nuclear annihilation brought new urgency to limitation, any limitation, on looming disaster.

The Soviet Union insisted on the abolition of all nuclear testing. The United States was open to such an agreement as long as compliance could be verified. It was easy enough to detect nuclear blasts in the atmosphere. Underground tests were another matter. The United States would agree to a comprehensive treaty with on-site inspections, and detection sites at strategic points in the USSR. Of course, the Soviet Union would be allowed have similar sites in the United States.

The Soviet Union argued that seismology was advanced enough to detect any violations. You can’t explode a nuclear bomb underground without producing rumbles. The United States pointed out that evidence provided by seismographs could not be definitive. Someone on the US side had thought of the existence of earthquakes.

Negotiators could not overcome basic differences. The Soviet Union would not accept anything less than a complete ban on nuclear testing. And they would not allow intrusive verification. The United States could accept a ban on atmospheric tests without internal detection sites and inspection rights, or a comprehensive ban on tests that would include internal verification.

There it stood for years.

Then the Cuban Missile Crisis scared the daylights, and almost the life, out of everyone. The Soviet Union would still not allow internal verification of compliance. But they changed their position, going along with a limited test ban treaty.

The issue of verification had, at last, been been settled. Further agreements would wait until the science of underground detection had advanced enough to tell the difference between an underground explosion and an earthquake.

American conservatives opposed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union had not, they said, given up the goal of overrunning the world. We were at war. It was a cold war, but it was still a war.

Barry Goldwater made the case that our position was inherently weakened as soon as we accepted limited goals. Avoidance of war should not be our chief objective. Our purpose should be complete victory over an oppressive world force.

There should be a ban, but it should be a ban on negotiating with an evil regime.

Other conservatives argued a simpler proposition. You could not trust the Soviet Union. That still seems like a mindless objection. The treaty was not based on trust. It was based on detection of violations. It was, in fact, a treaty based on mistrust.

Today, the Limited Test Ban Treaty is almost universally regarded as a positive milestone. It was the start of a continuing negotiation that greatly reduced the threat of nuclear catastrophe, along with the more immediate degradation of the air we breathe – – until the Soviet Union collapsed on its own.

As I listen to the debate over the nuclear arms agreement with Iran, I am reminded of the shadow of death that reached over the world for so long. The interim outline with Iran provides a framework that can avoid another costly war. The Iran agreement is not at all the same as the agreement with the Soviet Union half a century ago.

Still, I am especially struck by two similarities.

First:

The verification demanded by the United States once more demonstrates the distrust that is a prerequisite to an arms limitation agreement. We don’t make such agreements with those we trust. We have no similar agreements with Canada or Great Britain.

The fact that a few voices in Iran mischaracterize the agreement does not change that fact. If Iran violates the terms as we understand them, the agreement will cease to exist. And Iran knows it.

Second:

The primary objection by conservatives today is identical to that of 1963. Iran cannot be trusted.

That, the more obtuse of my conservative friends, is the only reason to have an agreement.

Nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries.

About Post Author

Burr Deming

Burr is a husband, father, and computer programmer, who writes and records from St. Louis. On Sundays, he sings in a praise band at the local Methodist Church. On Saturdays, weather permitting, he mows the lawn under the supervision of his wife. He can be found at FairAndUNbalanced.com

madmikes49@gmail.com